The Autocratic Voter: Understanding Partisanship and Electoral Behavior under Authoritarianism
In autocracies, why do some citizens support the regime in power while others defect? By taking seriously the role of partisanship and voting behavior in electoral autocracies, this book seeks to better understand the nature of defection under autocracy. The vast majority of our theories of authoritarianism start from the perspective of the regime, making arguments about the role of elections, institutions, repression, and cooptation to explain regime longevity, and, in the macro-level sense, mass legitimacy. In contrast, this book starts theoretically from the perspective of the citizen. Given an individual’s political, social, and economic experiences as a citizen of an autocratic state, what reasons would one have for participating in politics? The argument hinges on the long-standing finding from democratic countries that citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status (citizens with more resources, education, and social status) are better situated to participate in politics. However, under authoritarianism, socioeconomic status alone cannot explain who supports the regime and who defects to the opposition. In order to explain the cleavage between pro- and anti- regime partisans, we must understand the ability of the regime and the opposition to cultivate support. The argument highlights three key factors to understanding support and defection: information, patronage, and coercion. Citizens with higher access to information, those least connected to networks of regime patronage, and those most vulnerable to state repression should all be more inclined to support the opposition and democratization. Alternatively, ordinary citizens with less information, who are embedded in patronage networks, and who face little threat of repression should be most inclined to support the autocratic regime. Further, not only can these three factors help to explain whether an individual is more or less inclined to support the regime, they can also explain variation in support for authoritarianism across different countries. Because an individual who is embedded in patronage networks is more inclined to support the autocratic regime, we can extrapolate that autocratic ruling parties with wider patronage networks should attract larger numbers of partisan supporters. Highly repressive autocracies should feature lower numbers of partisan supporters. Regimes that highly regulate information likely depress partisanship across the board, but most strongly amongst opposition partisans. These factors can help to explain why some regimes build mass-based, highly inclusive ruling parties, while others rely on demobilizing citizens and depressing partisanship.
The Mechanisms of Direct and Indirect Rule: Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa (with Martha Wilfahrt)
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between British colonialism—specifically indirect rule—and economic development, but there is less consensus as to why indirect rule would produce better economic outcomes. This article develops three specific mechanisms to explain the relationship: the strength of traditional leaders, the salience of ethnic identities, and the legitimacy of local government, and test them using a geographic regression discontinuity research design on Cameroon’s internal Anglophone-Francophone border, a legacy of the country’s dual colonial heritage. We find the most evidence for the third mechanism, suggesting that indirect rule produced better economic outcomes because British colonialism was more likely to decentralize decision-making, which generated a stronger social contract between citizens and local government, imbuing the local state with more legitimacy.