Click here for full CV
PUBLICATIONS
Expressive Voting in Autocracies: A Theory of Non-Economic Participation with Evidence from Cameroon
Forthcoming, Perspectives on Politics
(Paper: Here)
Why do people vote in autocratic elections? Until now, most answers to this question have argued that people vote because they expect a material reward, such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying, or as a way of rewarding the regime for its economic performance. This article argues that citizens also vote for different non-economic, expressive reasons, such as a sense of civic duty or a desire to improve the democratic process. The article presents data from an original quasi-national public opinion survey conducted in Cameroon, which shows that expressive reasons for voting can explain more variation in voting behavior than economic reasons. These different motivations challenge the implications of existing models of democratization by explaining how some of the poorest electoral autocracies have withstood decades of economic stagnation.
The Political Geography of Electoral Autocracies: The Influence of Party Strongholds on Political Beliefs in Africa
2019, Electoral Studies, 60
(Paper: Here)
In electoral autocracies, why do some citizens view the state as autocratic, while others see it as democratic and legitimate? Traditionally, indicators such as income and education have been the most important factors to explaining why different types of citizens understand politics. This paper argues that in electoral autocracies, we must also take into account the role of political geography. Opposition parties are often one of the only actors that provide information about the authoritarian nature of the regime, but their message tends to get quarantined within their strongholds. I argue that regardless of income, education, ethnicity, or access to government spending, citizens living in opposition strongholds should be far more likely to view the state as autocratic and illegitimate than citizens living in ruling party strongholds. I find evidence for this theory using Afrobarometer survey data paired with hand-coded constituency-level electoral returns from five electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa.
Popular Support for Democracy in Autocratic Regimes: A Micro-Level Analysis of Preferences
(with Martha Wilfahrt)
2018, Comparative Politics, 50(2).
(Paper: Here)
Most scholars argue that democratization is impossible without support for democracy among at least some subset of a population. However, opinions diverge as to which citizens in autocratic regimes actually prefer democracy to the status quo. While some argue that citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to prefer democracy because they desire political equality, others argue that the poor should prefer democracy more because they will have more relative power to affect redistributive policies. This paper argues that both groups of citizens prefer democracy for the expected reasons, but that the inverse logic is incorrect: no group prefers democracy more than the other. Analyzing public opinion data for tens of thousands of respondents living in autocracies around the world, we show that the vast majority of citizens in authoritarian countries—rich and poor alike—prefer democracy to autocratic rule. Further, we test the implications of this theory and find that factors such as economic development and inequality have little effect on preferences for democracy. Drawing on two, brief case studies, we also analyze whether citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to act on their preferences for democracy after political shocks, whereas citizens with lower levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to act on them after economic shocks.
"The People's Choice": Popular (Il)legitimacy in Autocratic Cameroon
2017, Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(4).
(Paper: Here)
While many analysts assume that the autocratic regime of Paul Biya is deeply unpopular amongst ordinary Cameroonians, there is almost no existing analysis of public opinion in Cameroon. In fact, Cameroonians are deeply divided in their beliefs about politics; while many view the government as democratic and legitimate, others see the regime as entirely autocratic and illegitimate. What explains these fundamental divides in political beliefs? While existing theories point to demographic factors as the most important predictors of political opinions, this paper argues that in autocratic regimes,
political geography is even more important to understanding these divides. Political parties in autocratic regimes develop completely different narratives about the legitimacy of the state, and regardless of education, partisanship, age, or ethnicity, citizens living in party strongholds are far more likely to adopt these narratives than citizens outside of strongholds. Understanding these divides is critical to explaining regime legitimization in Cameroon, and African autocracies more broadly.
Voting for Peace, Mobilizing for War: Post-Conflict Voter Turnout and Civil War Recurrence
2017, Democratization, 24(3), p. 425-443
(Paper: Here)
In democratic elections around the world, high levels of voter turnout are frequently praised as a sign of democratic legitimacy and consolidation. However, while popular participation should be lauded in many circumstances, under certain conditions it can also have nefarious side effects. In post-conflict countries, high levels of voter turnout may make it easier for militants to return to arms because everyday people are invested in the political process and the electoral outcome. Through the use of survival modeling, this study finds that voter turnout is positively correlated with civil war recidivism in post-conflict first elections. Even when elections are not particularly contentious or when structural factors (such as level of development) are auspicious, voter turnout continues to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with recidivism.
WORKING PAPERS AND RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Book Project
The Autocratic Voter: Understanding Partisanship and Electoral Behavior under Authoritarianism
In autocracies, why do some citizens support the regime in power while others defect? By taking seriously the role of partisanship and voting behavior in electoral autocracies, this book seeks to better understand the nature of defection under autocracy. The vast majority of our theories of authoritarianism start from the perspective of the regime, making arguments about the role of elections, institutions, repression, and cooptation to explain regime longevity, and, in the macro-level sense, mass legitimacy. In contrast, this book starts theoretically from the perspective of the citizen. Given an individual’s political, social, and economic experiences as a citizen of an autocratic state, what reasons would one have for participating in politics? The argument hinges on the long-standing finding from democratic countries that citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status (citizens with more resources, education, and social status) are better situated to participate in politics. However, under authoritarianism, socioeconomic status alone cannot explain who supports the regime and who defects to the opposition. In order to explain the cleavage between pro- and anti- regime partisans, we must understand the ability of the regime and the opposition to cultivate support. The argument highlights three key factors to understanding support and defection: information, patronage, and coercion. Citizens with higher access to information, those least connected to networks of regime patronage, and those most vulnerable to state repression should all be more inclined to support the opposition and democratization. Alternatively, ordinary citizens with less information, who are embedded in patronage networks, and who face little threat of repression should be most inclined to support the autocratic regime. Further, not only can these three factors help to explain whether an individual is more or less inclined to support the regime, they can also explain variation in support for authoritarianism across different countries. Because an individual who is embedded in patronage networks is more inclined to support the autocratic regime, we can extrapolate that autocratic ruling parties with wider patronage networks should attract larger numbers of partisan supporters. Highly repressive autocracies should feature lower numbers of partisan supporters. Regimes that highly regulate information likely depress partisanship across the board, but most strongly amongst opposition partisans. These factors can help to explain why some regimes build mass-based, highly inclusive ruling parties, while others rely on demobilizing citizens and depressing partisanship.
Other Research
The Mechanisms of Direct and Indirect Rule: Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa (with Martha Wilfahrt)
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between British colonialism—specifically indirect rule—and economic development, but there is less consensus as to why indirect rule would produce better economic outcomes. This article develops three specific mechanisms to explain the relationship: the strength of traditional leaders, the salience of ethnic identities, and the legitimacy of local government, and test them using a geographic regression discontinuity research design on Cameroon’s internal Anglophone-Francophone border, a legacy of the country’s dual colonial heritage. We find the most evidence for the third mechanism, suggesting that indirect rule produced better economic outcomes because British colonialism was more likely to decentralize decision-making, which generated a stronger social contract between citizens and local government, imbuing the local state with more legitimacy.
PUBLICATIONS
Expressive Voting in Autocracies: A Theory of Non-Economic Participation with Evidence from Cameroon
Forthcoming, Perspectives on Politics
(Paper: Here)
Why do people vote in autocratic elections? Until now, most answers to this question have argued that people vote because they expect a material reward, such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying, or as a way of rewarding the regime for its economic performance. This article argues that citizens also vote for different non-economic, expressive reasons, such as a sense of civic duty or a desire to improve the democratic process. The article presents data from an original quasi-national public opinion survey conducted in Cameroon, which shows that expressive reasons for voting can explain more variation in voting behavior than economic reasons. These different motivations challenge the implications of existing models of democratization by explaining how some of the poorest electoral autocracies have withstood decades of economic stagnation.
The Political Geography of Electoral Autocracies: The Influence of Party Strongholds on Political Beliefs in Africa
2019, Electoral Studies, 60
(Paper: Here)
In electoral autocracies, why do some citizens view the state as autocratic, while others see it as democratic and legitimate? Traditionally, indicators such as income and education have been the most important factors to explaining why different types of citizens understand politics. This paper argues that in electoral autocracies, we must also take into account the role of political geography. Opposition parties are often one of the only actors that provide information about the authoritarian nature of the regime, but their message tends to get quarantined within their strongholds. I argue that regardless of income, education, ethnicity, or access to government spending, citizens living in opposition strongholds should be far more likely to view the state as autocratic and illegitimate than citizens living in ruling party strongholds. I find evidence for this theory using Afrobarometer survey data paired with hand-coded constituency-level electoral returns from five electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa.
Popular Support for Democracy in Autocratic Regimes: A Micro-Level Analysis of Preferences
(with Martha Wilfahrt)
2018, Comparative Politics, 50(2).
(Paper: Here)
Most scholars argue that democratization is impossible without support for democracy among at least some subset of a population. However, opinions diverge as to which citizens in autocratic regimes actually prefer democracy to the status quo. While some argue that citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to prefer democracy because they desire political equality, others argue that the poor should prefer democracy more because they will have more relative power to affect redistributive policies. This paper argues that both groups of citizens prefer democracy for the expected reasons, but that the inverse logic is incorrect: no group prefers democracy more than the other. Analyzing public opinion data for tens of thousands of respondents living in autocracies around the world, we show that the vast majority of citizens in authoritarian countries—rich and poor alike—prefer democracy to autocratic rule. Further, we test the implications of this theory and find that factors such as economic development and inequality have little effect on preferences for democracy. Drawing on two, brief case studies, we also analyze whether citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to act on their preferences for democracy after political shocks, whereas citizens with lower levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to act on them after economic shocks.
"The People's Choice": Popular (Il)legitimacy in Autocratic Cameroon
2017, Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(4).
(Paper: Here)
While many analysts assume that the autocratic regime of Paul Biya is deeply unpopular amongst ordinary Cameroonians, there is almost no existing analysis of public opinion in Cameroon. In fact, Cameroonians are deeply divided in their beliefs about politics; while many view the government as democratic and legitimate, others see the regime as entirely autocratic and illegitimate. What explains these fundamental divides in political beliefs? While existing theories point to demographic factors as the most important predictors of political opinions, this paper argues that in autocratic regimes,
political geography is even more important to understanding these divides. Political parties in autocratic regimes develop completely different narratives about the legitimacy of the state, and regardless of education, partisanship, age, or ethnicity, citizens living in party strongholds are far more likely to adopt these narratives than citizens outside of strongholds. Understanding these divides is critical to explaining regime legitimization in Cameroon, and African autocracies more broadly.
Voting for Peace, Mobilizing for War: Post-Conflict Voter Turnout and Civil War Recurrence
2017, Democratization, 24(3), p. 425-443
(Paper: Here)
In democratic elections around the world, high levels of voter turnout are frequently praised as a sign of democratic legitimacy and consolidation. However, while popular participation should be lauded in many circumstances, under certain conditions it can also have nefarious side effects. In post-conflict countries, high levels of voter turnout may make it easier for militants to return to arms because everyday people are invested in the political process and the electoral outcome. Through the use of survival modeling, this study finds that voter turnout is positively correlated with civil war recidivism in post-conflict first elections. Even when elections are not particularly contentious or when structural factors (such as level of development) are auspicious, voter turnout continues to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with recidivism.
WORKING PAPERS AND RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Book Project
The Autocratic Voter: Understanding Partisanship and Electoral Behavior under Authoritarianism
In autocracies, why do some citizens support the regime in power while others defect? By taking seriously the role of partisanship and voting behavior in electoral autocracies, this book seeks to better understand the nature of defection under autocracy. The vast majority of our theories of authoritarianism start from the perspective of the regime, making arguments about the role of elections, institutions, repression, and cooptation to explain regime longevity, and, in the macro-level sense, mass legitimacy. In contrast, this book starts theoretically from the perspective of the citizen. Given an individual’s political, social, and economic experiences as a citizen of an autocratic state, what reasons would one have for participating in politics? The argument hinges on the long-standing finding from democratic countries that citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status (citizens with more resources, education, and social status) are better situated to participate in politics. However, under authoritarianism, socioeconomic status alone cannot explain who supports the regime and who defects to the opposition. In order to explain the cleavage between pro- and anti- regime partisans, we must understand the ability of the regime and the opposition to cultivate support. The argument highlights three key factors to understanding support and defection: information, patronage, and coercion. Citizens with higher access to information, those least connected to networks of regime patronage, and those most vulnerable to state repression should all be more inclined to support the opposition and democratization. Alternatively, ordinary citizens with less information, who are embedded in patronage networks, and who face little threat of repression should be most inclined to support the autocratic regime. Further, not only can these three factors help to explain whether an individual is more or less inclined to support the regime, they can also explain variation in support for authoritarianism across different countries. Because an individual who is embedded in patronage networks is more inclined to support the autocratic regime, we can extrapolate that autocratic ruling parties with wider patronage networks should attract larger numbers of partisan supporters. Highly repressive autocracies should feature lower numbers of partisan supporters. Regimes that highly regulate information likely depress partisanship across the board, but most strongly amongst opposition partisans. These factors can help to explain why some regimes build mass-based, highly inclusive ruling parties, while others rely on demobilizing citizens and depressing partisanship.
Other Research
The Mechanisms of Direct and Indirect Rule: Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa (with Martha Wilfahrt)
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between British colonialism—specifically indirect rule—and economic development, but there is less consensus as to why indirect rule would produce better economic outcomes. This article develops three specific mechanisms to explain the relationship: the strength of traditional leaders, the salience of ethnic identities, and the legitimacy of local government, and test them using a geographic regression discontinuity research design on Cameroon’s internal Anglophone-Francophone border, a legacy of the country’s dual colonial heritage. We find the most evidence for the third mechanism, suggesting that indirect rule produced better economic outcomes because British colonialism was more likely to decentralize decision-making, which generated a stronger social contract between citizens and local government, imbuing the local state with more legitimacy.
